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and investment bankers often predict the
recent high level of corporate mergers and acquisitions cannot
be sustained. Yet in the first half of 1987 alone, 2,056 takeovers

conomists,

lawyers,

totaling $106.3 billion.
Some of last year's largest takeovers included US AIR Group's purchase
of Piedmont Airlines, Inc. for $1.7 billion and Security Pacific Corporation's
buy out of Rainier Bancorp for $1.1 billion (the latter may have been the largest

were announced

bank merger in U.S. history)."
Despite recent tax law changes, insider trading scandals, anti-takeover
measures adopted by potential target companies, and regulatory restraints
imposed by wary state legislatures,

the frenetic pace continues. Mergers and

acquisitions are not only a high stakes drama on Wall Street; they have become
a significant force in the U.S. economy.
Some claim corporate takeovers affect the economy positively—a
reflected in the following passage from the 1985 Economic Report
President:

belief

of the

The available evidence . . . is that mergers and acquisitions increase national wealth.
They improve efficiency, transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate
effective corporate management.”

A comprehensive evaluation of existing evidence, however, indicates these
assertions may be too sanguine. Takeovers may indeed have some positive
economic impacts, but they have some negative ones as well—inside and out
side the firm. Equally important, we simply do not have sufficient evidence
for a definitive conclusion. Corporate takeovers may increase the wealth of
some stockholders but decrease the wealth of others. They may improve
management efficiency or simply cause disruptions.

They may strengthen the

financial standing of some but cripple other companies with debilitating debt.
And certainly, there are unanswered questions about a takeover's unsettling
impact on employees and communities.
Such uncertainties suggest a black and white analytical sketch of the impact
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of corporate mergers and acquisitions will not do. What we need is a full por
trait of their impact—one that conveys the various shades of meaning embodied
in this powerful economic trend. That evaluation will take time; but given the
extent to which mergers and acquisitions

are reshaping the U.S. economy, it

is an exercise we cannot afford to neglect.

AT ISSUE
Questions regarding takeovers can be divided into four broad areas: (1)

What motivates a firm

to make a takeover

bid, and why do particular firms

targets for acquisition?

(2) What are the effects of takeovers on
in both the acquiring and acquired firms? (3) What are the ex

ternal effects of acquisition,

especially on employees and local communities?
(4) How have state and federal policymakers responded to the increasing
importance of takeovers in the economy?

Why Takeovers Occur. There

is much debate about why bidders

pur

Mergers and acquistions
are not only

a

become

stockholders

high stakes

drama on Wall Street;

Mesa Petroleum Chairman T. Boone Pickens, argue that corporate acquisi
tions, especially hostile takeovers, effectively discipline entrenched manage

they have become

ment and restore the competitive spirit of U.S. corporations.”
This view is based on two assumptions that can be tested empirically. First,

significant force

it suggests target companies perform poorly relative to other non-target firms
and especially to those firms seeking to acquire them. Second, it suggests target

U.S. economy.

companies

in

a

sue mergers and acquisitions. Supporters of the current wave of takeover ac
tivity, such as Professor Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School and

the

will perform better after a takeover than they did before.

Research shows, however, target companies are at least as profitable as
other corporations and in many instances as profitable as the firms acquiring

For example,

15 target companies in large hostile takeovers that
occurred in 1982 and 1983 had provided their shareholders with an 18-percent
corporations during
rate of return, well above the average rate of return for
all

them."

those years.
as

Evidence, then, does not support the hypothesis that economically inferior
corporations serve
targets for stronger, more aggressive competitors. This,

by

or

to

of

at

of

to

a

the desire
increase shareholder welfare
desire
welfare,
perhaps
expense
increase their own
the
shareholders.
For target firms, stockholders benefit regardless
the motivation behind
to

motivated either

by

is

as

however,
only one theory
why acquisitions occur. Others fall into two
general and somewhat contradictory categories: Acquiring firm managers are

in

In

on

in

acquired firms walk away with premiums that
the acquisition. Shareholders
average
percent
are
50
more than pre-bid share prices.
some cases shares
double
value. Such was the case when Greyhound acquired Verex and Johns
an

as

in

acquiring
cause for concern, not celebration.” Stockholder wealth
firms may increase (or
least not decrease) following acquisition,
the firms
gain financial strength
perhaps even monopoly power
the marketplace.
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If

the acquisition
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or

at

may

be

in

is

Manville acquired Olinkraft. This
undeniable acquisition benefit.
acquiring firms, however, takeover announcements
For shareholders

TAKEOVERS

enhance management (not shareholder) welfare,
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however, shareholders could find their shares declining in value. For exam
if managers acquire a firm because their compensation is tied to asset

ple,

growth, or to gain “psychic” income, or to make their companies larger as
protection against a takeover, shareholders may suffer losses if the merger is
not a good one. In effect, although managers may benefit, the acquisition lowers
the market's expectation of the firm's future performance, which, in turn, causes
stock prices to fall."

Indeed, growing evidence shows shareholders in acquiring firms suffer
economic losses, especially in the long run, after an acquisition. Shareholders
in acquiring firms can expect a rate of return that is five percent to 16 percent
less than projected

Takeovers

may indeed

for one to three years after a takeover." The projection
is based on the acquiring firm's performance before the takeover.”
The reasons for these losses are not well understood. Possibly, the market
wary

becomes

of

the substantial

increases

in debt often associated

with

or it loses confidence in the acquiring firm's ability to manage
effectively an acquired firm’s assets. Whatever the explanation, these losses
may translate into millions of lost dollars for shareholders in acquiring
takeovers,

have some positive

economic impacts, but
they have some negative
ones as well—inside and
outside the firm.

companies.

Although takeovers may have a negative effect on shareholder wealth in
acquiring firms, comparing average losses to the average gains among
shareholders in acquired firms yields a positive dollar amount. (Estimated

out

comes for specific companies, however, vary greatly.)” This suggests acquir
ing firm shareholders need to pay more attention to what managers are doing
with a company's equity. Are they reinvesting capital into the company? Are
they rewarding

shareholders?

Or

are they making acquisitions

that benefit

themselves at the expense of shareholders? In other words, are managers using
shareholder equity efficiently and productively?

The Effects of Rising Debt. A

takeover's impact, however, is not limited

Given the significant role debt plays in takeover financing,
the effects on bondholders also must be considered. Acquisitions are often
financed with so-called junk bonds or higher grade bonds." After acquisi
tion, acquiring firms may be saddled with heavy debt. For example, for 56
firms that organized hostile takeovers between 1976 and 1983, the average
to shareholders.

weighted debt-equity ratio rose from 52 percent in the year before the takeover
to 77 percent in the year after the takeover."

Bondholders in target firms, or even in potential targets, also may feel
the effects of takeover activity. One way to fight off unwanted takeover bids
in which companies reduce equity and increase
debt—thus making themselves less attractive to would-be raiders. The most
dramatic example of recapitalization is Phillips Petroleum's reaction to separate
bids by Mesa Petroleum and Carl Icahn. To avoid takeover, Phillips added
oil

is in

a

at
a

an

result,

it

a

its

equity base
to
debt burden and reduced
$5 billion. As
industry.”
became the most highly leveraged company
the
“greenmail;”
i.e.,
against
Another defense
unwanted takeover bid
target firm buys back
raider's shares
substantial premium. Such

$4.5 billion

a

by

recapitalization

its

is through

Perelman's Revlon Group $34 million
80
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payments are often financed through borrowing. For example,
avoid takeover,
Safeway paid Dart Group $139 million
greenmail, and Gillette paid Ronald

greenmail.”
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As debt rises, bond ratings are often downgraded because of a company's
more precarious economic condition. In 1986, Standard and Poor's reassessed
ratings on 513 bond issues; 364 were downgraded.

An

additional

205 cor

porate credits were subject to review because of mergers.”
For stockholders, takeovers could mean greater profits or greater losses—
often depending on whether they have investments in the acquired or the acquir

ing firms. For bondholders, greater indebtedness could reduce the face value
of their investment. These two groups, however, are not the only ones affected
by a corporation's changing fortunes in a takeover, particularly when it comes
to the consequences of indebtedness.
What will heavily leveraged companies do during an economic downturn,
when they face difficulty in making fixed interest payments? One option is for
a debt-laden acquirer to retire some of the debt by selling divisions of the recent
ly acquired target. Other options include reducing investments, assuming even
more debt to finance the existing debt, or declaring

bankruptcy.

How such

actions may affect the company's future profitability is unclear.
For shareholders and the economy at large, these are not attractive options.

Consider the effects of widespread declarations of bankruptcy. Not only will
the bankrupt firm's debt-holders and equity-holders be affected, so too will
customers, and companies that did business with the firm. In short,
bankruptcy follows, the effects of takeovers are no longer restricted to

suppliers,

if

stockholders and bondholders, and the takeover issue is raised beyond a prob
lem of private corporate governance.

Changes in Investment Behavior. The tendency to increase debt as
a means to influence management's investment and operating decisions is
magnified by the growing importance of institutional investors in the stock
market. The increase in institutional ownership, some economists argue, is
associated with a growing emphasis on short-term performance,

Research shows...target
companies are at least as

profitable as other

cor

porations and in many

in

stances as profitable as
the firms acquiring them.

perhaps at

of investments that pay off only in the long run.
As in other management decisions, the effect of emphasizing immediate
profitability at the expense of future returns is not limited to a firm's stockholders

the expense

and bondholders. Consider research and development (R&D) investments. In
the best of economic times, R&D investments are risky. If a company is heavily
indebted and fearful of takeover and-or of meeting substantial debt payments,
investment in a highly risky project is unlikely to be approved. Avoiding R&D
investments will not only be felt by the firm, through losses in future profitability,
but also by society. For example, successful R&D programs in the phar
maceutical industry translate into both higher corporate profits and increased

public welfare through more effective medicines.
Evidence to date shows no statistically significant changes in R&D invest
ments after takeovers.” What is not yet known, however, is whether changes
in the types of investments take place. For example, there could be a shift
toward less risky investments or toward investing abroad, either of which could
have important

consequences

for the nation's future economic welfare.
Effects. The effects of a takeover

Employee and Local Community

on employees in target firms may be divided into two categories: absolute
changes in the number and location of employees and more subtle changes
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because of changes in the work en
associated with corporate takeovers.
Direct evidence on either effect is hard to come by. However, much anec
dotal evidence culled from corporate takeover accounts suggests substantial

in employee attitudes and productivity
vironment

and uncertainty

cuts in employment follow a takeover. For example, after the creation of Unisys
by the merging of Sperry and Burroughs, 9,000 jobs were eliminated. Unfor
tunately, insufficient systematic analysis of a takeover's absolute and distribu
tional effects on employment
conclusions can be drawn.

has been

done;

consequently,

no general

What is clear, however, is the complexity of the issue. How one sees the
employment impact is often determined by the analytical lens one uses. For
example, while the number of jobs in a particular location may fall, new employ-

or

viewed differently from

a

be

in

all

employment opportunities will
tion
tive than from
national one.

local perspec

on

of

employee attitudes.
less ambiguous issue
the effect
takeovers
Acquisitions
general, but more
hostile takeovers, may negatively affect
employee attitudes and performance because
rising uncertainty about future

of

in

celebration.

not

balancing this positive effect are the economic and social costs of increasing
unemployment. For
these reasons, reductions
the labor force
redistribu

so

concern,

resources—an

is

for

firm's

a

cause

may be

a

outcome that may eventually result in lower prices. Counter

in

announcements

number of jobs decreases, this may reflect more efficient use of

of

quiring firms...takeover

ment opportunities in a company's headquarters located elsewhere may rise.
Thus employment opportunities may be redistributed. And, even if the absolute

A

For shareholders in ac

employment

and working conditions.

ing employee morale often follow

Increasing employee turnover and

fall

by

to

of

a

takeover. For example, when Diamond
Natomas,
percent
Shamrock took over
75
Natomas's staff left with severance
pay; when Connecticut General merged with INA
form CIGNA, the CIGNA
4,200, with most employee losses coming from INA."
work force fell

in

by

be

by

of

an

an

in

employees through on-the-job training and because
Because firms invest
employees develop firm-specific human capital,
increase
turnover may
indicate
inefficient use
human capital
the firm.
and others may also
affected
local community changes.
important
proposed
This issue was
the recent
takeover
Minnesota's largest
retailer, Dayton, Hudson Company,
the Washington, D.C. based Dart Com

of

high level

philanthropy.

There was

by

noted for

its by

pany. Dayton, Hudson

is

in

of

Employees

the company were owned
interests outside Minnesota,
civic funding would decline. Nonprofit organizations and communities that had
benefited from Dayton, Hudson's generosity
the arts and social services
feared diminished corporate

commitment

to

to

if

great concern that

community

welfare."

STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS

on

tant direct effects on takeovers, but also paved the way for passage
takeover statutes.

82
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its

of

in
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The Williams Act
1968 represented the first expression
concern among
policymakers over the impact
corporate takeovers
private
both
and public
subsequent amendments) not only had impor
interests. This statute (and
state
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The Williams Act stipulated an acquiring firm would have to meet specified
requirements

disclosure

and wait a certain amount of time before a takeover
The intent was to provide managers and shareholders in

could be finalized.
a target

firm sufficient time and information

fully evaluate a takeover bid.

to

“First generation”

state takeover laws basically emulated the

although some contained stricter reporting requirements

One striking effect

and longer waiting

its

from 32 percent

the nine years following

in

A

in

in

to

Williams Act,

these laws has been the increased premiums
acquired firms.
recent study estimates the Williams

paid shareholders
Act raised average premiums

53 percent

two-tier

of

periods.

a

the second, lower-priced tier

of

being

in

tunity to tender at
offer.

or
of

all

This gave them protection from unexpected offers in which shareholders might
feel compelled to respond quickly. Taking time to evaluate an offer—in the
absence of mandated legislated delay—raised the risk of missing the oppor

the pre-regulation

period

passage; state takeover laws have

be

added another 20 percent. The Williams Act and subsequent state takeover
responsible for fewer takeover bids, perhaps because they
laws also may
increase takeover costs."

effects

of take

over are

felt outside the

firm, public policy
becomes relevant.

to

to

of

Following the Williams Act, 36 states passed takeover statutes. Several
these statutes were struck down by the courts. They were ruled
conflict
neutrality
with the Williams Act (which intended
maintain
between target

...if the

or

to

and bidding firm interests) and with the Constitution's commerce clause (which
granted Congress sole power
regulate interstate commerce). Such judicial

in

hostile takeover bids and

the

as

the growth

of

the 1980s, most notably

in

might have deterred state legislatures from maintaining
enacting
new state takeover statutes. Takeover activity, however, changed significantly

in

opinions

of

of

takeover statutes, the characteristics
which may
illustrated
examining Indiana's takeover legislation recently upheld
the Supreme
by

by

generation”

be

a

of

golden parachutes, poison
number and types
anti-takeover defenses, such
pills, and dual-class recapitalizations.” These changes brought forth
“second

Court.

on
a

if

is

of

granting certain
the Indiana statute
shareholders the right
decide
other shareholders may vote. “Disinterested”
shareholders, which typically excludes management and bidders, may vote
to

The most controversial provision

from exercising their votes

on

a

to

be

to

takeover bid.
Through this provision, raiders and managers can
prevented from voting
on takeover bid, thereby leaving the decision
the other shareholders. The
restrict other shareholders

Court upheld this highly controversial statute
the grounds
shareholder voting rights are
internal corporate matter traditionally governed
by state law. This ruling paved the way for other states
adopt similar anti
ruling,
regulations;
takeover
since the Indiana
12 states have adopted anti
to

an

Supreme

existing legislation.”
on

modified

completion,

which

federal statute. Lengthening

is

its

in

a

the Indiana statute that touches
central point
required 50-day waiting period between the announce

takeover bid and

time required

by

a

ment

of

the takeover debate

is
a of or

A

takeover legislation
second aspect

30 days longer than the

the delay raises two important

policy concerns: the statute's neutrality between competing corporate parties:
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and the conflict between national and state interests. Such delays make it easier
for a target firm's management to launch an anti-takeover defense or to search

for a “white knight.” A longer waiting period is thus advantageous to a target
firm, a consequence that conflicts with the Williams Act's intent to keep the
arm of government neutral in takeover battles. Assessing this point requires
consideration of the second issue: the conflict between state and national inter
ests. Assume, although this contradicts some evidence cited above, takeovers
occur because they promote efficiency. From a national perspective, closing
plants or reducing
tions reduces

...the evidence does not
support the assertion that
takeovers increase

national welfare.

the number of workers by eliminating overlapping
domestic production costs. However, for the community

func
that

depends on one or two companies for jobs or charitable donations, a different
perspective takes hold.
This difference in federal and state perspectives is manifested most clearly

in Ohio's takeover statute. In evaluating takeover proposals,
ordered

to consider

not only the interests of shareholders,

directors are

which is the stan

dard responsibility of directors, but also the interests of employees, suppliers,
customers, and the local economy.” The combination of a longer delay period
and a broadened policy perspective emphasizes Ohio's desire to put state inter
ests in a primary

position.

Although the most dramatic changes in takeover legislation have occurred
at the state level, the future is likely to bring changes in federal legislation
as well. Bills introduced in the first session of the 100th Congress addressed
issues related to both target and acquiring firms. The bills propose a longer
waiting period before a takeover is finalized. They also prohibited managers

in target firms from using greenmail, golden parachutes and other anti-takeover
devices without first receiving stockholder approval. The bills are intended
(1) to give managers and shareholders in target firms sufficient time to evaluate
offers and (2) to restrict managers from blocking a takeover bid at the expense

of the company's future financial health. Despite these trends, the final form
of state and federal legislation is not yet clear.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Takeovers have an internal effect on a firm's stockholders and bondholders
and an external effect on employees,

communities,

and the economy.

Effects purely internal to the firm do not alone demand a public policy
response. If only shareholders suffer financial losses resulting from acquisi
tions, one can argue that only internal corporate policies and-or corporate gov
ernance regulations should be changed. In that relatively simple situation, no
reasonable economic arguments exist to justify public intervention with regard
to takeovers.

if the effects of takeover
relevant. If takeovers generate

However,

are felt outside the firm, public policy
positive externalities, government might

becomes
want to subsidize takeovers to ensure an optimal number take place; this argu
ment is analogous to the one applied to public investments in socially beneficial

R&D efforts. Conversely, if takeovers generate negative externalities, controls
on their character

or quantity should be developed.
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Despite evidence that acquiring firm shareholders often lose, research shows
the positive net economic effects of acquisitions. This indicates that, from the
perspective of the acquiring firms, corporations face a problem in the domain
of corporate governance. There may be internal company problems that allow

acquiring firm managers to pursue actions that do not serve shareholder inter
ests. From a nationwide perspective, this does not make takeovers a public
policy issue. Such findings suggest public intervention in corporate takeovers
may be justified only if a company is motivated by a desire to avoid taxes or
to attain monopoly

power.

Analyzing the internal effects of takeover activity on corporate firms,
however, is only part of the story. If takeovers are shown to exert significant
external effects on workers, communities, R&D, and the macroeconomy, public

make policies on that misperception could

to

be

takeovers are not
the same and
damaging
the economy.

to

all

it

conflicting findings and unresolved issues, the evidence does not support the
assertion that takeovers increase national welfare. Further,
also suggests

fact, great variety exists—

can be made
tender offers (in which the bidding firm's
managers appeal directly
target firm stockholders)
mergers (in which
as

to

or

as

e.g., acquisitions

events.

In

homogeneous class

of

a

is

The assumption underlying most analyses, although rarely stated explicitly,
that takeovers are

benefits and costs...

policymakers must
recognize the different
impacts

of different types

of takeovers.

society, policymakers

must recognize the different impacts

of

to

different characteristics. When considering the benefits and costs

of

of

a

is

or of

negotiated between the managers
takeover bid
the bidding and target
firms; moreover, they may be paid for with cash
by exchanging stocks).
The public and private effects
takeovers will undoubtedly vary with these

When considering the

©

can be drawn. With

•

may be justified.
Based on this evidence, two general conclusions

its

policy intervention

takeovers

different types

of takeovers.

an

all

to

This relationship needs
be better understood before appropriate options
can be developed. The policy most likely formulated will neither encourage
nor discourage
takeovers but create
environment that nurtures publicly

takeovers must

be

ferent types

of

is

of

and privately beneficial takeovers and inhibits those that are not beneficial.”
developed, many questions regarding the effects
Before that policy
dif
answered.
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time this article went to press, it was still too early to assess the impact on takeover
activity of the historic 508-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average that took place
on October 19, 1987. In fact, it is possible that two conflicting trends will emerge from

At the

22.

the crash: (1) in some areas, takeover activity could increase as many companies become

takeover bargains available at a fraction of their pre-crash selling price; (2) in other areas,
takeover activity could decrease as companies use their resources to buy back their own,
now lower priced shares. Under the second scenario, there would be a decrease in the
number of outstanding shares for these firms, thus making a takeover more difficult.
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